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Abstract
On March 16, 2008, the Federal Reserve created the Primary Dealer Credit Facility, or PDCF,
to provide overnight funding to primary dealers in the tri-party repurchase agreement
(repo) market, where lenders had become increasingly risk averse. Loans were fully secured
by (initially) investment-grade securities and offered at the primary credit rate by the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The eligible collateral was significantly expanded in
September 2008, after rumors of Lehman Brothers potentially filing for bankruptcy, to
include all of the types of instruments that could be pledged at the two major tri-party repo
clearing banks. The PDCF was a means for the Federal Reserve to provide lender-of-lastresort funding directly to primary dealers, including the five largest US investment banks,
which it could not do before. The program also served to buy time for dealers to find other
methods of financing. During its tenure, the facility was actively used, with the highest daily
amount of outstanding loans at $130 billion, which occurred in September 2008. Overall, 18
of the 20 primary dealers participated in the program, although, unlike the other major
program targeting primary dealers, the Term Securities Lending Facility, most participation
was by US firms. The facility was closed on February 1, 2010. All loans extended under this
facility were repaid in full, with $593 million in interest and fees collected. It has been
credited, with other similar programs, with relieving the severe liquidity stresses on primary
dealers during the height of the crisis.
Keywords: PDCF, repo market, primary dealers, liquidity

1 This case study is part of Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project modules

considering the responses to the Global Financial Crisis that pertain to market liquidity programs.
Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-offinancial-crises/.
2 Karen Y. Yang - Summer Intern, YPFS, School of Management.
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Primary Dealer Credit Facility
At a Glance
In March 2008, Bear Stearns nearly failed, owing to an inability
to raise sufficient funds in the repurchase agreement (repo)
markets. Lenders were worried about the creditworthiness of
borrowers as well as the risk of their collateral (especially
mortgage-backed securities). Concerned that another primary
dealer might experience a run as Bear had, the Federal Reserve
(Fed) on March 11, 2008, announced the Term Securities
Lending Facility (TSLF) to provide primary dealers with an
alternative source of funding for illiquid assets. However, the
TSLF would not hold its first auction until March 27.
On March 16, 2008, the Fed announced the Primary Dealer
Credit Facility (PDCF), which was intended to calm the
financial markets by providing primary dealers overnight
collateralized loans from the Fed at the primary credit rate. The
PDCF was established under the Fed’s emergency authority
under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act as a lender in
“unusual and exigent circumstances.” It relied on the two major
tri-party repo clearing banks to perform collateral and
valuation services for PDCF loans (haircuts were applied).
Loans were made with recourse to the borrower’s other assets.
The program was immediately utilized, with outstanding loans
quickly rising to $40 billion in late March before falling to zero
in July 2008. Usage spiked again in September 2008, when
Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy instigated an additional market
strain. As a result, the Fed expanded PDCF-eligible collateral to
encompass all collateral eligible in the tri-party repo system,
including some whole loans as well as below-investment-grade
and unrated securities. Outstanding PDCF loans peaked at
$130 billion on September 23, 2008, before falling again as
financial market conditions improved. The Fed also made loans
similar to the PDCF loans to London affiliates of four primary
dealers, which when aggregated with PDCF loans resulted in a
peak of $156 billion outstanding loans on September 29, 2008.

Summary of Key Terms
Purpose: To improve the ability of primary
dealers to provide financing to participants in
securitization markets and promote the orderly
functioning of financial markets more generally.
Announcement
Date

March 16, 2008

Operational Date

March 17, 2008

Expiration Date

February 1, 2010

Legal Authority

FRA Section 13(3)

Term

Overnight

Rate

Primary credit rate

Collateral

Originally OMO-acceptable
collateral and investmentgrade
securities.
In
September 2008, broadened
to any tri-party repo
collateral

Other

Recourse, frequency use fee

Peak Utilization

$130 billion

Participants

Primary dealers and a
handful of London affiliates
of four primary dealers

Summary Evaluation
The PDCF is generally seen as having been successful, although it is unclear how successful the program was in restoring
liquidity in the securitization market. Participation was widespread, surging after Lehman’s bankruptcy, when the
interbank markets were particularly tight. Additionally, the broadening of eligible collateral in September 2008 helped
reduce the likelihood that primary dealers would sell assets in distressed markets to meet their liquidity needs.
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Primary Dealer Credit Facility: United States Context
GDP
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to
USD)

$14,681.5 billion in 2007
$14,559.5 billion in 2008
Source: Bloomberg

GDP per capita
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to
USD)

$47,976 in 2007
$48,383 in 2008
Source: Bloomberg
As of Q4, 2007:

Sovereign credit rating (5-year senior
debt)

Fitch: AAA
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA
As of Q4, 2008:
Fitch: AAA
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA
Source: Bloomberg
$9,231.7 billion in total assets in 2007
$9,938.3 billion in total assets in 2008

Size of banking system

Source: Bloomberg
62.9% in 2007
68.3% in 2008

Size of banking system as a percentage of
GDP

Source: Bloomberg
Banking system assets equal to 29.0% of
financial system in 2007
Banking system assets equal to 30.5% of
financial system in 2008

Size of banking system as a percentage of
financial system

Source: World Bank Global Financial
Development Database
43.9% of total banking assets in 2007
44.9% of total banking assets in 2008

5-bank concentration of banking system

Source: World Bank Global Financial
Development Database
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22% of total banking assets in 2007
18% of total banking assets in 2008

Foreign involvement in banking system

Source: World Bank Global Financial
Development Database
0% of banks owned by the state in 2008
Government ownership of banking system

Existence of deposit insurance

Source: World Bank, Bank Regulation and
Supervision Survey
100% insurance on deposits up to $100,000 for
2007
100% insurance on deposits up to $250,000 for
2008
Source: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
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I.

Overview

Background
By late 2007, problems in the subprime mortgage market began to spread into the interbank
lending markets and panic grew, resulting in a contraction in some types of lending,
particularly term lending. Primary dealers, which are the securities firms that trade with the
Federal Reserve in order to implement monetary policy, were particularly dependent on triparty repurchase agreements (repos) for their funding. As term funding became more
expensive, outstanding overnight tri-party repurchase agreements by primary dealers grew
to a peak of $3 trillion in March 2008, the equivalent of 75% of total primary dealer financing,
reflecting significant rollover risk. Furthermore, lenders were worried about the risk of the
collateral they were buying, especially the mortgage-backed securities, resulting in rising
haircuts, even for safer collateral such as Treasuries. The risky collateral brought risk into
the market and increased the chance of a repo run (as would impact Bear Stearns), which
then could lead to sales of securities at depressed prices (Adrian, Burke, and McAndrews
2009).
The Fed’s earlier programs were limited to providing liquidity only to depository
institutions, and there was no guarantee that the liquidity provided to these depository
institutions would be passed on to primary dealers. Therefore, the Federal Reserve sought
to provide liquidity directly to primary dealers.
On March 7, the Fed introduced a single-tranche open-market operation that allowed
primary dealers to borrow at a 28-day term—much longer than its typical overnight loans—
using traditional open-market operations (OMO) collateral (see separate note). However,
that program accepted only high-quality collateral. On March 11, 2008, the Federal Reserve
Board announced the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF), which allowed participants
(primary dealers) to exchange less-liquid collateral for Treasuries, which would be
acceptable as repo collateral. However, the TSLF’s first auction would not be held until March
27, 2008. In the days following Bear Stearns’s near failure, additional liquidity strains were
observed in the repo market, and the Federal Reserve Board grew concerned that other
primary dealers might face runs on their liquidity, as Bear had. It was also concerned about
the risk that the clearing banks were facing at the increased possibility that a major financial
institution might fail. The clearing banks held borrowers’ collateral overnight on behalf of
repo lenders—typically short-term investors, like money market mutual funds—which lent
cash overnight. But during the day, the clearing banks “unwound” the trades, returning cash
to the lenders and collateral to the borrowers—and essentially lending their own cash to the
borrowers. If a clearing bank chose not to unwind a borrower’s trades out of concern it might
default during the day, all of its repo lenders would be left holding collateral that they then
would be forced to sell quickly, flooding a depressed market (Adrian, Burke, and McAndrews
2009). Thus, the Fed sought to provide a more immediate and direct solution (GAO 2011).
Program Description
At the height of the Bear Stearns crisis, the Federal Reserve worked continuously over the
weekend of March 15-16 to create a facility that could assist primary dealers with funding in
the event that Bear Stearns filed for bankruptcy (OIG 2010). The Federal Reserve Board
granted the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) the authority to establish the
Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF), announced on March 16, 2008, to “improve the ability
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of primary dealers to provide financing to participants in securitization markets and
promote the orderly functioning of financial markets more generally” (Federal Reserve
2008).
The PDCF was established under the Fed’s powers granted to it under Section 13(3) of the
Federal Reserve Act, which allowed it to act as a “lender of last resort” to nonbanks in
“unusual and exigent circumstances” and if the borrower was unable to attain other means
of credit. Any loans made under Section 13(3) had to be secured to the satisfaction of the
lending reserve bank.
The PDCF provided overnight secured loans to primary dealers. To carry out this mission,
the PDCF utilized its existing operational relationships with the primary dealers and the triparty repo system that it used for its OMO repo operations and in which JP Morgan Chase &
Co. and Bank of New York Mellon were the two tri-party repo clearing banks (GAO 2011).
This enabled the Fed to make the PDCF operational just one day after announcing it.
To participate in the PDCF, primary dealers signaled a request for an overnight loan to their
clearing banks, usually before 5 p.m. ET on a business day. Once the clearing bank confirmed
that a sufficient amount of eligible collateral had been pledged to cover the loan, it would
price the pledged collateral and apply a haircut. The clearing bank would proceed to notify
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY), which would then also acknowledge that
the primary dealer had pledged a sufficient amount of margin-adjusted eligible collateral.
The FRBNY would then transfer the loan amount to the clearing bank for credit to the
primary dealer’s account. This process is illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Structure of the PDCF

Source: GAO 2011
Loans made under the PDCF were collateralized but also made with recourse, ensuring that
the primary dealer was responsible for repayment even if the collateral lost value overnight.
Initially, eligible collateral for the PDCF was restricted to collateral that was eligible in the
Fed OMOs; investment-grade securities, including corporate bonds; municipal securities;
and asset-backed securities (ABS), including mortgage-backed securities. In September
2008, eligible collateral was expanded to match all types of collateral eligible in the tri-party
repo system, which included some noninvestment-grade securities, equity securities, and
whole loans.
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For collateral eligible in OMOs, haircuts assigned were equivalent to haircuts under the
OMOs. For collateral not eligible in OMOs, haircuts were determined by the asset’s risk and
were generally higher than those under OMO standards. The PDCF was designed to last six
months, subject to extension based on market conditions.
PDCF operations were published in a weekly (Federal Reserve’s H.4.1 weekly statistical
release, Factors Affecting Reserve Balances of Depository Institutions and Condition
Statement of Federal Reserve Banks) and monthly (Credit and Liquidity Programs and the
Balance Sheet) release on the Federal Reserve Board’s public website (OIG 2010). Only broad
numbers were reported, such as the average daily loan size for the week. The names of
specific borrowers were not disclosed in order to protect borrowers from stigma associated
with relying on the Fed for loans. The Fed hoped that this level of anonymity would
encourage participation in the program. In December 2010, the Fed released PDCF loan
details, along with details from its other emergency lending programs, in accordance with
the new requirements of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
of 2010.
The funding and management of the PDCF was conducted by the FRBNY. However, the
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago (FRB-Chicago) and the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta
(FRB-Atlanta) provided operational assistance in implementing the PDCF (OIG 2010).
The PDCF terms did not impose a borrowing limit for any individual primary dealer.
Therefore, the amount of funding that any primary dealer could borrow under the PDCF was
limited only by the amount of haircut-adjusted eligible collateral that such a primary dealer
could present to its clearing bank. However, the PDCF did originally impose a frequencybased penalty fee on primary dealers that accessed the facility on more than 30 days out of
any 120 days (OIG 2010).
On February 3, 2009, the facility frequency usage fee changed, so that fees were calculated
based on use of the facility for more than 45 business days out of the preceding 180 business
days. The fee would increase up to 40 basis points (annualized rate) as the primary dealer
continued to access the facility past the 45-business-day mark (OIG 2010).
The PDCF also did not specify an overall funding limit, as some Fed programs did. In this way,
it was similar to the Federal Reserve’s discount window in that it served as a backstop source
of liquidity for primary dealers during market disruptions. Before the creation of the PDCF,
primary dealers that were not depository institutions had no access to a “lender of last
resort” credit facility.
Affiliates of foreign banks, such as Barclays, BNP Paribas Securities, Daiwa Securities
America, Deutsche Bank Securities, and UBS Securities LLC, that operated in the US as
primary dealers were eligible to utilize the PDCF, and they did (Reuters 2010). The
disclosure of just how much these foreign-related entities borrowed from the facility became
a point of contention in public perception (Reuters 2010). However, on an aggregate basis,
dealers with European parents were often heavy borrowers from the TSLF but very light
borrowers from the PDCF. Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), for example, borrowed from the
TSLF on 57 occasions but never borrowed from the PDCF (Achayra et al. 2014).
Outcomes
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The PDCF was immediately popular, as seen in Figure 2. In its first week, the PDCF extended
loans to 10 primary dealers. During its first three weeks, borrowing averaged over $30
billion per day and then peaked at $40 billion per day in March 2008 before gradually
declining to zero in July, where it stayed until September. Bear Stearns was consistently the
largest PDCF borrower until its purchase by J.P. Morgan Chase in March 2008 (Achayra et al.
2014; GAO 2011; Adrian, Burke, and McAndrews 2009).
Figure 2: PDCF Loans Outstanding

Source: GAO 2011
Borrowing spiked shortly after the Federal Reserve expanded eligible collateral following
the Lehman bankruptcy filing. The expanded collateral included all of the types of
instruments that could be pledged in the tri-party repo systems of the two major clearing
banks, which included equity securities and whole loans.
Lending rose to $59.7 billion on September 17, and peaked at $130 billion on September 26,
2008, in just PDCF loans. Including loans to London affiliates (London loans), as discussed
below, the peak was $156 billion reached on September 29, 2008, the day Congress rejected
the administration’s first proposed bank bailout bill (GAO 2011). Following those events, as
market conditions improved, usage of the facility gradually declined to zero in May 2009.
In total, 18 of the 20 eligible primary dealers ultimately utilized the facility, and the Federal
Reserve made 1,021 loans under the PDCF, with the five largest borrowers accounting for
82.5% of all PDCF loans, as shown in Figure 3 (Adrian and Schaumburg 2012, GAO 2011).
The biggest borrowers overall were Citigroup, Morgan Stanley, and Merrill Lynch, with each
borrowing over $1 trillion in loans. Of course, these figures represent the sum of multiple
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overnight draws. The largest single loan, of $47.9 billion, went to Barclays Capital on
September 18, 2008, the day after Barclays agreed to buy most assets of Lehman Brothers’
US broker-dealer (Reuters 2010). Including London loans, the largest PDCF borrowing for a
firm at one time was by Morgan Stanley, which had a total of $61.3 billion outstanding
through the PDCF on September 29, 2008, about one-third of which was through London.
Notably, Citigroup borrowed into April 2009, and Bank of America took out its last loan in
May 2009; both banks had received other targeted assistance from the government (Reuters
2010).
Figure 3: Largest PDCF Borrowers by Total Dollar Amount
Dollars in billions
Rank Primary dealer
1

Citigroup Global Markets Inc.

Total PDCF
loans
$1,756.8

2

Morgan Stanley & Co. Inc.

1,364.4

18.5

3

Merrill Lynch Government Securities Inc.

1,281.8

17.3

4

Bear Stearns & Co., Inc.

850.8

11.5

5

Banc of America Securities LLC

845.6

11.4

6

Goldman Sachs & Co.

433.6

5.9

7

Barclays Capital Inc.

410.4

5.6

8

J.P. Morgan Securities Inc.

112.3

1.5

9

Lehman Brothers Inc.

83.3

1.1

10

Countrywide Financial Corporation

75.6

1.0

11

BNP Paribas Securities Corp.

66.4

0.9

12

Mizuho Securities USA Inc.

42.3

0.6

13

UBS Securities LLC.

35.4

0.5

14

Cantor Fitzgerald & Co.

28.1

0.4

15

Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC

1.5

0.0

16

Deutsche Bank Securities Inc.

0.5

0.0

17

Daiwa Securities America Inc.

0.4

0.0

18

Dresdner Kleinwort Securities LLC

0.1

0.0

$7,389.4

100.0%

Total

Source: GAO 2011
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Note: Total borrowing for J.P. Morgan Securities reflects consolidation of total borrowing by
Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc. after the acquisition was completed. Amount shown for Bank of America
Corporation reflects consolidation of total borrowing by Merrill Lynch and Countrywide
following the completion of those acquisitions.
Acharya et al. (2014) found that many firms that borrowed heavily from the TSLF also
borrowed heavily from the PDCF. Other findings by Acharya were that companies that
pledged greater shares of equity to the TSLF tended to be heavy borrowers at the PDCF,
suggesting that the expansion of collateral to include equity in September created a strong
incentive for dealers to borrow at the PDCF. Moreover, dealers that pledged large
proportions of equity at the PDCF also pledged large proportions of other risky assets, such
as MBS/CMOs, ABS, corporate securities, and municipal securities at both the PDCF and TSLF
(Achayra et al. 2014).
Notably, despite the Fed having greatly expanded liquidity resources for banks, bankaffiliated primary dealers also heavily borrowed from the PDCF, as can be seen in Figure 4.
Figure 4: PDCF Usage by Type

Source: Adrian and Schaumburg 2012

II.

Key Design Decisions

1. The legal authority for the PDCF came from Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve
Act.
Specifically, it was established under the Fed’s emergency authority under Section 13(3) of
the Federal Reserve Act as a lender in “unusual and exigent circumstances.”
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2. The PDCF extended loans to primary dealers.
The PDCF utilized its existing operational relationships with the primary dealers and the triparty repo system that it used for its OMO repo operations and in which JP Morgan Chase &
Co. and Bank of New York Mellon were the two tri-party repo clearing banks (GAO 2011).
Affiliates of foreign banks, such as Barclays, BNP Paribas Securities, Daiwa Securities
America, Deutsche Bank Securities, and UBS Securities LLC, that operated in the US as
primary dealers were eligible to utilize the PDCF and did (Reuters 2010). The disclosure of
just how much these foreign-related entities borrowed from the facility became a point of
contention in public perception (Reuters 2010). However, on an aggregate basis, dealers
with European parents were often heavy borrowers from the TSLF but very light borrowers
from the PDCF. RBS, for example, borrowed from the TSLF on 57 occasions but never
borrowed from the PDCF (Achayra et al. 2014).
3. The PDCF allowed the Federal Reserve to lend directly to investment banks to
provide liquidity to securitized markets.
The Bear Stearns crisis highlighted the importance of investment banks to the liquidity of
securitization markets. Even though the Fed had previously taken steps through its OMOs
program and the TSLF to address the stresses in the short-term wholesale funding markets,
there was concern that these vehicles might not fill any gap in liquidity that might occur. The
TSLF was announced first but was not yet operational. More information on TSLF can be
found in Leon Hoyos’s Term Securities Lending Facility Case (Leon Hoyos 2019).
Establishment of the PDCF reflected a determination that in the brewing situation, and given
the critical role of the primary dealers, lender-of-last-resort financing needed to be extended
beyond commercial banks, allowing the Fed to provide short-term funding directly to
investment banks as well.
4. Collateral requirements were initially restricted to investment-grade securities
but were expanded to all types of collateral eligible in the tri-party repurchase
agreement system.
Initially, the PDCF was restricted to collateral eligible for OMOs, investment-grade securities,
municipal securities, and asset-backed securities (ABS), including mortgage-backed
securities. In September 2008, accepted collateral was expanded to include all types of
collateral eligible in the tri-party repurchase agreement system, which included
noninvestment-grade securities. This potentially provided access to a greater amount of
funding, since a primary dealer could now bring a wider range of collateral to the PDCF if it
could not finance it in the market.
5. The Fed took steps to mitigate risk.
The Fed included several design features that were intended to mitigate the risk inherent in
the PDCF. These included having collateral valued by the clearing banks at the least available
value and applying haircuts.
For collateral eligible in OMOs, haircuts assigned were equivalent to haircuts under the openmarket operations. For collateral not eligible in OMOs, haircuts were determined by the
asset’s risk and were generally higher than those under OMOs. However, the Fed’s haircuts
were less than market haircuts would have been during the crisis, thus providing to
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borrowers more funding against a particular collateral than they might have received
elsewhere (Adrian, Burke, and McAndrews 2009).
6. The lending rate was the primary credit rate.
The lending rate was equivalent to the discount window’s primary credit rate at the FRBNY,
a standard that reinforced the Fed’s intent to have the PDCF operate similarly to the discount
window and to make the funding financially accessible. The primary credit rate is the
discount window’s most favorable rate.
However, under normal conditions, the discount rate exceeds the overnight repo rate for
most eligible securities, with the result that the PDCF would not be an especially attractive
means of financing an inventory of securities in normal market conditions. This meant that
the eligible borrowers would be incentivized to use the PDCF only as a backstop, not as a
primary funding source, as markets returned to normal levels. (Adrian, Burke, and
McAndrews 2009). Additionally, the Fed actively counseled borrowers to seek funding in the
markets before utilizing the PDCF (Adrian, Burke, and McAndrews 2009).
7. The PDCF was designed to last for six months, subject to extension based on market
conditions.
At the creation of the PDCF, the Federal Reserve announced its intention to maintain the
program for six months. The hope was that by then, fear in the markets would have abated
to a sufficient level and that primary dealers would have been able to arrange other methods
of financing. However, the Fed cautiously kept an open-ended timeline, noting that the
program “may be extended as conditions warrant to foster the functioning of financial
markets.” In the end, the program was extended a total of four times before being terminated
in February 2010.
8. To avoid stigma and encourage participation, few details regarding PDCF
participants were published at time of use.
In creating the PDCF, the Fed was worried that primary dealers would not take advantage of
this opportunity due to stigma, a serious concern that threatened to inhibit the facility’s
effectiveness and one that the Fed had previously encountered with respect to its Discount
Window (The Wall Street Journal 2008). If a bank was particularly weak and in need of a loan
but was the only bank known to be in that situation, the bank might be reluctant to borrow,
despite need, for fear of identification. Even if the Fed didn’t publish the names of its
borrowers, creditors might surmise which bank the user was, creating a negative reputation
around that particular bank. Thus, PDCF activity was publicly reported only in aggregate on
a weekly and monthly basis. It was not until December 2010 that the Fed released
transaction details, including participants and their individual loan amounts, after Congress
mandated such disclosures.
9. A frequency-based fee applied.
The FRBNY incorporated a frequency-based penalty fee to primary dealers who accessed the
facility more than 45 days out of the preceding 180 business days, so as to discourage usage
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when other means of funding were available. The fee would increase as the primary dealer
continued to access the facility past the 45-business-day mark:
(i)

First 45 days: no fees

(ii)

46-90 days: 10 basis points, annualized rate

(iii)

91-135 days: 20 basis points, annualized rate

(iv)

136-180 days: 40 basis points, annualized rate

We have not located any information that suggests that any borrower paid the frequencybased fee.
10. Loan size and type were not limited.
The PDCF terms did not impose a borrowing limit on the size of loans that primary dealers
could take but allowed the borrowing dealer to choose the size of their loan request. The
amount of money available to a primary dealer under the PDCF was thus limited by the
amount of haircut-adjusted eligible collateral that each primary dealer could present to its
clearing bank. However, although not limited as to amount, loans were subject to a frequency
fee. To avoid stigma and encourage participation, few details regarding PDCF participants
were published at time of use.
11. The Federal Reserve worked closely with the SEC to mitigate risk and establish a
monitoring program at each of the major primary dealers.
Under the PDCF, the Federal Reserve became a potential lender to primary dealers. To
manage the accompanying risks, the Federal Reserve positioned analysts at each of the major
independent primary dealers, thus creating a monitoring program to improve lines of
communication between the Federal Reserve and the dealers. In July, the Federal Reserve
entered a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) that affirmed the SEC as the ultimate supervisor of the investment banks.
This was intended to show concerned individuals and government agencies that the Federal
Reserve had not unduly expanded its oversight powers through the PDCF (Geithner 2010;
Adrian, Burke, and McAndrews 2009).
12. The Federal Reserve modeled loans to certain London-based affiliates on the PDCF.
In September and November 2008, the Federal Reserve extended credit to London-based
affiliates of three investment banks that were becoming bank holding companies and to
Citigroup, respectively. Although not formally PDCF loans, the loans to these affiliates were
under terms similar to those of the PDCF, with a few differences. With respect to these
“London loans,” however, the Fed accepted collateral denominated in foreign currencies
from the London-based affiliates, and it applied higher haircuts to this collateral (GAO 2011).
See the Appendix for more discussion of the London loans.
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III. Evaluation
Adrian, Burke, and McAndrews (2009) concluded that the existence of the PDCF reassured
primary dealers and their customers, and it contributed to the lull in emergency lending in
late July 2008. They also credit it with helping to protect prudentially managed institutions
from the spillover effects of risks taken by highly leveraged firms, enabling these institutions
to maintain their securities inventories and to fulfill their obligations to creditors and clients.
(Adrian, Burke, and McAndrews 2009).
However, the PDCF’s specific role in alleviating liquidity constraints in the market is difficult
to determine with precision, given that the Fed announced other similar programs in March
2008, such as the TSLF, which was also created to address funding challenges faced by
primary dealers. As a result, some of the research considers the two programs together.
Nevertheless, the PDCF’s design as an overnight loan facility as well as its broader range of
eligible collateral compared to the TSLF were key elements in responding to deteriorating
liquidity conditions in the repo market (Adrian, Burke, and McAndrews 2009).
Acharya et al. (2014) reviewed the two programs available to primary dealers and found that
generally, participation in the PDCF and TSLF (measured by average borrowings) was
greater for dealers with weaker financial conditions (as measured by their average precrisis
cumulative equity return and leverage). The authors also found that borrowers that were
weaker were more likely to participate in auctions and seek to borrow significantly larger
amounts utilizing collateral of lower quality. Additionally, borrowers with more non-Fedeligible collateral on their balance sheets prior to the facilities were more likely to borrow
from the two programs. This is likely a function of the higher cost of securing market funding.
In some respects, it also makes the point that solvency and liquidity problems tend to be
correlated. Another relationship found was greater usage by those entities having a higher
ratio of repos to total liabilities (Achayra et al. 2014)
Although results are difficult to attribute solely to PDCF, the London Interbank Offered RateOvernight Indexed Swap (LIBOR-OIS) spread (a general measure of financial market stress
and banks’ willingness to loan to one another) seemed to indicate improved functioning of
the overall markets during the facility’s tenure. Historically, the spread hovered around 10
basis points. In March 2008, it increased from 60 to 83 basis points, and spiked to 360 points
in October 2008. The LIBOR-OIS spread decreased significantly in mid-January 2009 and
returned to a 10-15-point range by September 2009, reflecting improved financial market
conditions (OIG 2010). More important, as the spread fell, utilization of the PDCF decreased
(OIG 2010).
Moral hazard continues to be one of the strongest criticisms of the PDCF. Some have
commented that by offering primary dealers a liquidity backstop, the PDCF effectively
encouraged continued risky behavior. Primary dealers could have delayed raising equity
because they knew that they could easily borrow from the Federal Reserve instead. But it
should be noted that the facility did include design features (such as a frequency usage fee)
intended to mitigate moral hazard (Adrian, Burke, and McAndrews 2009).
It is worth noting that although the post-crisis financial reforms enacted by Dodd-Frank
placed restraints on some portions of the Federal Reserve’s powers under Section 13(3), the
PDCF would be allowable under the current form of the law because it provided relief to a
class of firms.
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VI.

Appendix

Loans to London Affiliates
On September 21, 2008, the Federal Reserve Board (Fed) announced that it would extend
terms similar to the PDCF to the U.S. and London affiliates of three primary dealers: Merrill
Lynch & Co., Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley to provide support to these entities as they
became bank holding companies that would be regulated by the Fed (GAO 2011). In
November 2008, the Fed also authorized a PDCF loan to the London affiliate of Citigroup Inc.
(Citi) as part of a larger package of aid to Citi (GAO 2011).
The Fed considered this to be separate from the PDCF (GAO 2011). However, the Fed at times
has included this data with reports of PDCF data. Several researchers have also considered
them together, and so we discuss these London loans here.
The Fed made 355 loans to London affiliates of the four primary dealers, with the total
amount of these loans aggregating to $1.56 trillion as shown in Figure 5 below. The largest
amount of outstanding London loans occurred on September 29, 2008, when there was $26
billion outstanding contributing to the combined PDCF-London loan peak of $156 billion, as
shown in Figure 4.
The interest rates and collateral requirements for the London loans were the same as those
for the PDCF. Notable differences, however, were that the FRBNY accepted collateral
denominated in foreign currencies from the London-based affiliates, and it applied higher
haircuts to this collateral (GAO 2011).
It is unknown from whom the Fed received the collateral, which would be a key concern in
cross-border lending.
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Figure 5: Total Dollar Amount Borrowed by London-based Primary Dealer Affiliates
Dollars in billions
Primary dealer

Loans to London
affiliates

1 Morgan Stanley & Co. Inc.
2 Merrill Lynch & Co.
3 Citigroup Global Markets Inc.
4 Goldman Sachs & Co.
5 Banc of America Securities LLC
Total

$548.2
493.1
263.5
155.7
101.2
$1,561.6

Percent of
total
35.1%
31.6%
16.9%
10.0%
6.5%
100.0%

Note: Amount shown for Banc of America Securities reflects borrowings by the London affiliate of Merrill Lynch Government
Securities subsequent to completion of Bank of America Corporation’s acquisition of Merrill Lynch.

Source: GAO 2011
A US Government Accountability Office (GAO) report would later question the Fed’s rationale
for extending this funding. (See Evaluation above.) In the GAO report, the Fed’s response is
described as follows:
Federal Reserve Board officials told us that the Federal Reserve Board did not
consider the extension of credit to these subsidiaries to be a legal extension of
PDCF but separate actions to specifically assist these four primary dealers by
using PDCF as an operational tool. Federal Reserve Board officials told us that
the Federal Reserve Board did not draft detailed memoranda to document the
rationale for all uses of Section 13(3) authority but that unusual and exigent
circumstances existed in each of these cases, as critical funding markets were
in crisis. However, without more complete documentation, how assistance to
these broker-dealer subsidiaries satisfied the statutory requirements for
using this authority remains unclear (GAO 2011).
The GAO suggests that a lack of complete documentation of how this extension satisfied the
requirements for usage of Section 13(3) authority resulted in problematic transparency and
accountability issues.
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